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I.R.C. § 4960'S IMPACT ON COLLEGE
SPORTS: IN LIGHT OF IRS GUIDANCE
CERTAIN UNIVERSITIES WILL NEED TO
ENGAGE IN TAX PLANNING
KARLA M. NETTLETON*

INTRODUCTION
The college sports industry is booming to the billions. Fiscal year 20182019 was a record-breaking year for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA"). The NCAA, for the first time ever, broke $1.1 billion
in revenue.1 Similarly, in Fiscal year 2019, the Power Five college sports
conferences had more than $2.9 billion in combined revenue.2 The expansion of
the SEC that includes Texas and Oklahoma could top that revenue by the 20242025 fiscal year, with an earth-shattering $1.3 billion in revenue.3
As a result of the growing industry, Athletic Directors’ and coaches' salaries
also continue to rise. More than 240 athletic directors and coaches across the

* Karla M. Nettleton is an attorney in Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c.’s Tax Practice. Working
out of the Milwaukee office, Karla focuses her practice on a wide range of tax matters, including tax
controversy, tax litigation and tax planning for clients ranging from individuals to Fortune 500
Companies. She graduated magna cum laude from Marquette University Law School in 2017, with a
Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports Law Institute. A special thanks to Joshua Hernandez,
a Reinhart Summer Associate and Marquette law student, for his invaluable contribution as a research
assistant for this piece. His enthusiasm and passion for the topic provided Karla with the energy to bring
the article to the finish line. Karla would also like to thank her Reinhart colleagues who continually
support her and her passion for sports taxation. She dedicates this article to her mother, Rebecca
Nettleton.
1. NCAA 2019 Form 990.
2. Steve Berkwitz, Power Five Conferences Had Over $2.9 Billion in Revenue in Fiscal 2019, New
Tax Records Show, USA TODAY (July 10, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/2020/07/10/power-five-conference-revenue-fiscal-year-2019/5414405002/.
3. Steve Berkowitz, Analysis: If SEC Adds Texas and Oklahoma, the Conference Could Generate
as Much Revenue as NCAA, USA TODAY (July 27, 2021, 2:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/07/26/college-football-if-sec-expands-could-match-ncaa-1-3-billionrevenue/5377990001/.
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FBS receive compensation above $1 million.4 Most athletic departments in the
Power Five employ at least two, if not three, individuals whose compensation
exceeds $1 million.5 At least one coach in Football, Men's and Women's
Basketball, and Baseball make more than $1 million a year.6
Athletic Directors and Coaches are not the only ones that are on their way
to being highly compensated. In October 2019, the NCAA's governing board
voted unanimously to allow college athletes to be compensated for their name,
image, and likeness.7 The National Bureau of Economic Research conducted a
study to attempt to quantify the revenue that college football and basketball stars
could make if they were compensated. The study found that high-profile football
players could earn up to $2.4 million per season, while a star basketball player
could earn up to $1.2 million.8 Proponents of paying college athletes argued that
the players generate more than $14 billion in revenues for college sports
programs.9
College athletics departments and organizations have historically been
granted tax-favorable treatment.10 Most university and college athletic

4. Robert Lattinville & Roger Denny, How The New Excise Tax Impacts Coach Compensation,
ATHLETIC DIR. U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/how-the-new-excise-tax-impacts-coachcompensation/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
5. Id.
6. Kurtis Quillin, Here's What Kim Mulkey Will Make as Head Coach of Women's Basketball at
LSU, KCEN-TV (Apr. 28, 2021, 8:20 PM), https://www.kcentv.com/article/sports/heres-what-kimmulkey-will-make-as-head-coach-of-womens-basketball-at-lsu/500-5e28c111-f590-467f-9adfcae66aa2f060.
7. Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, NCAA
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-startsprocess-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities. In June of 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court
also ruled on the compensation of student athletes. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20512_gfbh.pdf. The compensation of athletes is beyond the scope of this article. However, the projected
compensation of athletes shows growing revenue within the sports industry.
8. Tom Huddleston Jr., College Football Stars Could be Earning as Much as $2.4 Million Per Year,
Based on NCAA Revenues: Study, CNBC.COM (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/09/02/how-much-college-athletes-could-be-earning-study.html.
9. Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. Athletes Could Be Paid Under New California Law, THE N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/sports/college-athletes-paid-california.html.
10. William A. Drennan, Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of College Athletics: A Balanced
Proposal, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1353, 1373 (2012) (documenting that tax law has treated nonprofit athletic
organizations and college athletic programs as integral parts of the tax-exempt college); See also
Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, This is Our House! – The Tax Man Comes to College Sports, 29 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 347, 348-49 (2019) (noting that Prior to 2018, college athletics had historically enjoyed
favorable federal tax treatment due to their tax-exempt status); See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The NCAA,
Tax Exemption and College Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 110 (2010) (noting dissenters of the
tax-exempt status of the NCAA, including political representative Bill Thomas (R-CA22) and George
Will, Op-Ed Columnist for The Washington Post).
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departments and the NCAA have been granted tax-exempt status.11 But in 2017,
Congress targeted the increasing executive compensation of tax-exempt
organizations by passing a 21% excise tax on certain executive compensation
paid by tax-exempt organizations (the "Excess Compensation Excise Tax").12
The reform targets certain tax-exempt organizations, including U.S. colleges
and universities. However, the final legislation contained mistakes and
ambiguities that were left to the IRS to clarify. Subsequent IRS clarification has
now led to a disparity that could create an inequity between public and private
collegiate athletic departments.
The purposes of this article are to (1) provide a summary of the tax-exempt
organization of the collegiate sports industry; (2) provide a summary of the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax and current IRS guidance and its impact on
collegiate supports; and (3) conclude that both private universities and certain
public universities should engage in tax planning to avoid the significant impact
of the Excess Compensation Excise Tax and prevent an inequity between public
and private school athletic departments.
I. THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
The Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") provides different avenues for
organizations to receive tax-exempt status. Historically, university and college
athletic departments and organizations like the NCAA have qualified for taxexempt status under one of three avenues: (i) Section 501(a) as a
Section 501(c)(3) organization, (ii) Section 115, or (iii) under the doctrine of
implied statutory immunity.13 Generally, universities and colleges and other
organizations that receive tax-exempt status under one of these three avenues
are not subject to tax on their income, as long as that income is used in
furtherance of their exempt purpose.14 Each of these three avenues for taxexemption are discussed below.
Section 501(c)(3) provides a tax exemption for charitable organizations.15
Charitable organizations include corporations that are organized and operated
11. See Drennan, supra note 10; See also Kissa-Schulze, supra note 10 (there are numerous other
favorable provisions within the tax code that favor college athletics); (some of these provisions were
changed with tax reform in 2017). Id. But this article only focuses on compensation.
12. See H.R. Res. 1, 115th Cong. (2017-2018) (enacted).
13. Andrew D. Appleby, For the Love of the Game: The Justification for Tax Exemption in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 179, 180-181 (2010); See also Kissa-Schulze, supra
note 10, at 348-349.
14. Id.: See also I.R.C. § 511 (universities and colleges are subject to tax on any unrelated business
income); See also Appleby, supra note 13, at 180-181 (in addition, tax-exempt entities are subject to
the private inurement and private benefit doctrines). The private inurement and private benefit doctrines
are discussed in more detail in section A infra p.180-81.
15. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2021).
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exclusively for educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition.16 In 1967, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 67-291,
which provided that university athletic programs are an "integral" part of the
educational process and help to further the educational programs of a university,
and thus qualify for federal tax exemption.17 This position was reiterated in 1980
by Revenue Ruling 80-296. Subsequent case law has also supported that college
and university athletic departments are generally considered educational in
nature and qualify as section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations.18 Generally,
private universities and colleges, including their athletic departments, meet the
educational requirements of section 501(c)(3) and qualify for federal taxexemption.19 Some public universities are also organized as section 501(c)(3)
organizations under the educational requirements.20
Similarly, college athletic organizations such as the NCAA are also
organized as tax-exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3), but as
organizations that foster national or international amateur sports competition.
Prior to 1976, fostering national or international amateur sports was not a
charitable purpose listed in Section 501(c)(3). But in 1976, Congress amended
501(c)(3) to include the fostering of "national or international amateur sports
competition" as a charitable purpose.21 The fostering of national or international
amateur sports was also upheld by subsequent case law.22 This addition to
Section 501(c)(3) has allowed organizations such as the NCAA and Olympic
sports organizations to be tax-exempt.23
Section 115 provides that income, for tax purposes, does not include
"income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential
governmental function . . ."24 Section 115 allows public universities that are a
function of their state government to exclude most of their income from
taxation.25 While public universities may exclude income based on Section 115,

16. Id.
17. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184.
18. Kissa-Schulze, supra note 10, at 360-361.
19. Id. at 359.
20. Id.; See also Appleby, supra note 13, at 181.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1730 (1976) (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2017)).
22. Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1982).
23. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39775 (Oct. 29, 1985); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 291825 (Jan, 24,
1985).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 115(1) (2021).
25. Richard Schmalbeck & Lawrence Zelenak, The NCAA and the IRS: Life at the Intersection of
College Sports and the Federal Income Tax, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1145-1147; Appleby, supra note
13, at 181; I.R.C. § 115.
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they can also seek tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3).26 In fact, public
universities have applied for and received determinations that they are exempt
under Section 501(c)(3). For example, the University of California, Los
Angeles, University of Michigan, University of Florida, and Florida State
University have all applied for and received determination letters.27 Other
universities specifically state that they are exempt under Section 115. For
example, the University of Arizona specifically states that it is not a 501(c)(3)
organization and provides to its donors and sponsors its determination letter
from the IRS indicating that it is a section 115 entity.28
Lastly, public universities may also be exempt under doctrine of implied
statutory immunity. The IRC does not explicitly exempt states and their political
subdivisions from federal income tax. However, the IRS has concluded that
states and their political subdivisions are free from federal income tax, under
the doctrine of implied statutory immunity – in other words that they are exempt
because no provision of the IRC taxes them.29 The IRS' position is detailed in
General Counsel Memorandum 14,407, which concludes that "unless otherwise
specified in the Code, states and their political subdivisions are not taxpayers
under the code, and their income is not gross income within the meaning of
section 61."30 The General Counsel Memo has been reiterated in a series of
revenue rulings issued by the IRS. In Revenue Ruling 87-2, the IRS stated
"Income earned by a state, a political subdivision of a state, or an integral part
of a state or political subdivision of a state is generally not taxable in the absence
of specific statutory authorization for taxing such income."31 A subsequent
Technical Advice Memorandum issued by the IRS concludes that a university
system is a political subdivision of the state, and as an integral part of the
political subdivision of the state, it is the type of entity to which immunity
applies.32
Therefore, private universities are generally exempt under
Section 501(c)(3), and public universities, while they may be exempt
under 501(c)(3), generally are not subject to income tax under Section 115 or
26. Id.
27. Ellen P. Aprill, Revisiting Federal Tax Treatment of States, Political Subdivisions, and Their
Affiliates, 23 FLA. TAX. REV. 73, FN 146, (2019).
28. Id.; See also https://www.fso.arizona.edu/sites/fso/files/2019-01/Donors_Sponsors_2019.pdf
29. Aprill, supra note 27, 83.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 85-86; Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18. The ruling concludes that the Lawyer Trust Fund
Account is an integral part of the state. See also Revenue Ruling 87-2 also refers I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B)
(unrelated business income tax) as an example of a specific statutory authorization for taxing the
income of a state or political subdivision.
32. Rev. Rule 87-2, supra note 31. The doctrine of implied statutory immunity or intergovernmental
immunity does not apply to unrelated business income. Public universities are still subject to the
unrelated business income tax under section 511.
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the doctrine of implied statutory immunity.
II. TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 AND § 4960.
In 2017, Congress passed the most significant tax reform since 1986.33 That
legislation has come to be known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ("TCJA"). The
TCJA contained numerous changes to tax law, including some provisions that
could potentially impact the college sports industry.34 The number of changes
and their impact is beyond the scope of this article. This article focuses on a
single provision of the TCJA – Excess Compensation Excise Tax.
A. Historical Tax Landscape of Compensation paid by Non-profits
To understand the applicability and impact of the Excess Compensation
Excise Tax, it is important to understand the laws that apply to compensation
paid by nonprofits. Prior to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax, there were
still limitations on compensation paid by Non-profits. Specifically, colleges and
universities exempt under 501(c)(3) are subject to the rules on excess benefit
transactions and private inurement.35
Organizations exempt under 501(c)(3) are required to be organized and
operated for the benefit of the public, rather than for private interest.36 However,
"[o]ccasional economic benefits flowing to persons as an incidental
consequence of an organization pursuing exempt charitable purposes will not
generally constitute private benefits."37 These rules are known as the private
benefit doctrine.
“As part of the prohibition on private benefits, charitable organizations are
also prohibited from allowing any part of their net earnings to inure to the
benefit of any private individual or shareholder.”38 A private individual or
shareholder is defined as a “person having a personal and private interest in the
activities of the organization."39 This is known as the private inurement doctrine.
The private inurement doctrine is more limited than the private benefit doctrine
because the private inurement focuses only on the beneficiary’s relationship to

33. TAM 7904006 (1979).
34. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, This is Our House! – The Tax Man comes to College Sports, 29
MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 347 (2019) (For a broader discussion of all of the changes that impact the
college sports industry).
35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); I.R.C. § 4958.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
37. American Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. 1053, 1066 (1989).
38. Rohlfing et. al., Lessons of the Colleges and Universities Compliance Project, 25 TAX’N
EXEMPTS 08, 12 (2013).
39. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(a)-1(c).
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the organization and types of benefits being received by that individual.40 The
private inurement doctrine requires that dealings between a charitable
organization and its insider be reasonable, at arm's length, and in good faith.
The primary example is if this is reasonable compensation.
An organization does not violate the private inurement doctrine if the
organization pays reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered.41
However, if the compensation is excessive, as determined partially by Code
Section 162, the compensation may result in a private inurement. Whether
compensation is reasonable is exclusively a factual determination made on a
case-by-case basis.42 Compensation also includes all economic benefits
provided by the tax exempt employer in exchange for the services provided.43
These include salary, bonuses, deferred compensation, severance, benefit plans,
certain insurances, certain fringe benefits, retirement and pension benefits, use
of nonprofit assets and resources, tangible goods, and so on.44
The IRS has created a safe harbor for tax exempt organizations when setting
compensation. The safe harbor requires the organization to take specific steps
in setting the compensation. There are three steps required in setting the
compensation:
(1) Approve the terms of the compensation package in advance,
with any member having a conflict of interest in abstaining
from the vote;
(2) Obtain and relay on appropriate comparability data prior to
making a decision; and
(3) Adequately document its basis for its decision on the
compensation package concurrently with making the
decision.45
The safe harbor requires that the organization have sufficient information
and data to set the compensation package. This includes reliable information
about:
(1) compensation paid by similarly situated organizations (for40. IRM 4.76.3.11.1(1) from the 2012 Internal Revenue Manual
41. 26 C.F.R. § 71-126; see 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-7(b)(3).
42. Brent T. Wilson, Compensation and Private Inurement in Charitable Organizations: How much
is too much?, ADVOCATE, Sep. 2011, at 23.
43. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(b)(ii)(B).
44. Id.
45. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a).
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profit and nonprofit) for functionally comparable positions;
(2) the availability of similar services in the area where the taxexempt organization is located;
(3) current compensation surveys prepared by independent
consulting firms; and
(4) actual written offers from competing organizations for the
services of the disqualified person.46
So long as the organization pays reasonable compensation to its officers,
directors, trustees, and key employees, no excess benefit transaction occurs.47
There are two consequences to violating the private benefit or private
inurement doctrine. The first is revocation of the organization’s exempt status.48
The second is a tax on the excess benefits received under IRC section 4958.
Section 4958 was created to penalize organizations without taking away their
exempt status.49 Section 4958 imposes on each excess benefit transaction a tax
of 25% of the excess benefit.
It is important to note that private organizations, including businesses, are
also subject to reasonable compensation rules. Reasonable compensation stems
from the deduction under Section 162(a)(1) for "a reasonable allowance for
salaries and other compensation for personal services actually rendered.50 Under
these rules, a reasonable salary is the amount that "would ordinarily be paid for
like services by like enterprises under like circumstances."51 This requirement
is similar to the exempt safe harbor that requires the exempt organization to
have comparable data and ensure the compensation is similar to other similarly
situated individuals.
Similarly, Section 162(m) of the code disallows the deduction to publicly
held corporations for "applicable employee remuneration with respect to any
covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the
taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000."52 In other
words, publicly traded corporations are penalized for excessive compensation
by not being permitted to deduct that compensation to offset income –
theoretically resulting in a higher tax. Section 162(m) was enacted in 1993 by
the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, and was targeted at excess

46. Wilson, supra note 42, at 24.
47. Rohlfing et. al., supra note 38, at 12.
48. John Marshall L. Sch. v. United States, 81-2 USTC 9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
49. Rohlfing et. al., supra note 38, at 12.
50. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a).
52. I.R.C. § 162(m).
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compensation being paid to C-suite executives.53 The TCJA also made
amendments to section 162(m), including expanding the definition of covered
employees, and removing a well-used and broad exception to the rules.54 The
purpose of which was to get at the growing compensation being paid to C-Suite
executives.55
B. Section 4960's Legislative History
The legislative history for the Excess Compensation Excise Tax is relatively
silent on its intent.56 Most commentators seem to agree that the purposes of the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax was related to Congress' decision to get
serious about excessive compensation, specifically, section 162(m).57 It seems
that Congress decided that if for-profit corporations would be subject to
penalties on excess compensation, so should tax-exempt organizations.58
However, because tax-exempt organizations do not pay tax, they do not take a
deduction for compensation, and thus a provision like 162(m) denying a
deduction would not work.59 The solution, then was to impose an excise (or
penalty) tax.60
The legislative history also does not indicate an intent to target universities
– whether public or private – or college athletic salaries.61 Post enactment of the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax, there was significant commentary on
whether the tax applied to both public and private universities, and was targeting
college athletic salaries.62 Even the IRS expressed a wide range of views on
whether the law applied to both public and private universities.63 Ultimately, the
decision was left to the IRS.

53. Schmalbeck & Zelenak, supra note 25, at 1150-1151.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64.
57. Schmalbeck & Zelenak, supra note 25, at 1150-1151.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64.
62. See Ellen Aprill, Congress Fumbles the Ball on Section 4960, MEDIUM (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/congress-fumbles-the-ball-on-section-4960-guest-postby-ellen-aprill-18a2dbf98c5f.; Douglas A. Kahn, Does Excise Tax on Excessive Comp Apply to State
Universities?, 158 TAX NOTES 397, 398 (2018); Ellen P. Aprill, Response to Professor Kahn: Tax
Status of Public Universities, 158 TAX NOTES 539, 539-40 (2018).
63. See Schmalbeck & Zelenak, supra note 25, at 1146-47 for a discussion of the IRS and public
officials discussions.
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C. I.R.C. § 4960, Interim Guidance, Proposed and Final Regulations
1. Code Section 4960
The Excess Compensation Excise Tax was codified in the IRC as
section 4960.64 Code section 4960 imposes an excise tax on an exempt
organization that pays excess compensation to certain employees. Specifically,
Code section 4960 imposes an excise tax equal to the top corporate income tax
rate (currently 21%) on an applicable tax-exempt organization ("ATEO") that
pays remuneration (i.e., compensation) in excess of $1 million and/or parachute
payments to any of the ATEO's five highest-paid covered employees (the
"Covered Employees").65 There are several key definitions under section 4960:
Term

Definition

ATEO:

Any organization which for
the taxable year:
(A) is exempt from taxation
under section 501(a)
(B) is a farmers’ cooperative
organization described in
521(b)(1)
(C) has income excluded from
taxation under section 115(1),
or
(D) is a political organization
described in section
521(e)(1).66

64. Wilson, supra note 42, at 24.
65. I.R.C. § 4960.
66. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(1).
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Any employee of an applicable
tax-exempt organization if the
employee (1) is one of the five
highest compensated
employees of the organization
for the taxable year, or (2) was
a covered employee of the
organization (or any
predecessor) for any preceding
taxable year beginning after
December 31, 2016.67

Renumeration

Wages (as defined in section
3401(a)), except that such term
shall not include any
designated Roth contribution
(as defined in section 402(c))
and shall include amounts
required to be included in
gross income under section
457(f).68 Renumeration does
include renumeration paid by a
related person or governmental
entity.69

127

Section 4960 also applies to any entities that are related to an ATEO.70
Section 4960 provides that "[a] person or governmental entity shall be treated
as related to an applicable tax-exempt organization if such person or
governmental entity—
(1) controls, or is controlled by, the organization
(2) is controlled by one or more person which control the
organization
(3) is a supported organization (as defined in section 509(f)(3))
during the taxable year with respect to the organization
67. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(2).
68. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(3).
69. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(4)(A).
70. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(4).
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(4) is a supporting organization described in section 509(a)(3)
during the taxable year with respect to the organization, or
(5) in the case of an organization which is a voluntary
employees’ beneficiary association described in section
501(c)(9), establishes, maintains, or makes contributions to
such voluntary employees’ beneficiary association.71
The Statute itself left open numerous questions and ambiguities. One of the
major ambiguities surrounded whether governmental entities were included
under the definition of ATEO. As such, practitioners and the like called for
additional guidance from the IRS. The IRS issued Interim Guidance in
Notice 2019-09. Under Notice 2019-09, the IRS determined that "a
governmental unit (including a state college or university) that does not have a
determination letter recognizing its exemption from taxation under
section 501(a) and does not include income from gross income under
section 115(1) is not an ATEO described in section 4960(c)(1). However, such
a governmental unit may be liable for excise tax under section 4960 if it is a
related organization under 4960(c)(4)(B) with respect to an ATEO."72 The IRS
also determined that a governmental entity could voluntarily relinquish its taxexempt status under 501(c)(3).73 In other words, a federal instrumentality was
not subject to the excise tax.
The IRS reversed course in its proposed regulations, subjecting Federal
instrumentalities to the excise tax.74 In the final regulations issued January 19,
2021, the IRS stated that "these final regulations do not address this issue but
reserved 53.4960-1(b)(3) and 53.4960-4(a)(5) for future rules to address these
Federal instrumentalities."75 The IRS further stated that:
"[u]ntil further guidance is issued, a Federal instrumentality for
which an enabling act provides exemption from all current and
future Federal taxes may treat itself as not subject tax under
section 4960 as an ATEO or related organization. However, if
that Federal instrumentality is a related organization of an
ATEO, renumeration it pays must be taken into account by that

71. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(4)(B).
72. I.R.S. Notice 2019-09, at 40.
73. Id.
74. Tax on Excess Tax-Exempt Organization Executive Compensation, 85 Fed. Reg. 35,746, 35,748
(proposed Jun. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
75. Tax on Excess Tax-Exempt Organization Executive Compensation, 86 Fed. Reg. 6,196, 6,197
(Jan. 19, 2021) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53).
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ATEO."76
This determination essentially means that tax-exempt entities under 501(c)(3)
and section 115(a) are subject to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax, as
explicitly stated in the statutory language of § 4960, but tax-exempt entities
under statutory immunity are not subject to the tax.
III. APPLICATION OF § 4960 FOR COLLEGE INSTITUTIONS
As previously discussed, college universities and organizations are
generally tax-exempt in one of the following three ways: (i) under IRC
Section 501(c)(3) as an educational organization or an organization fostering
amateur sports and (ii) under IRC Section 115(a) as a governmental entity, or
(iii) a federal instrumentality. Two of the three results in the university or
organization being subject to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax. In other
words, private universities, charitable organizations (i.e., NCAA), and public
universities exempt under 501(c)(3) or 115(a) are subject to the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax. Whereas universities organized as federal
instrumentalities under the doctrine of statutory immunity are not.
The purpose of this article is not to make a conclusion on whether
section 4960 or the IRS' current guidance is correct. Rather, the purpose of this
article is to show the disparity that arises and encourage both private and certain
public universities to seek tax planning to avoid the significant impact of the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax. At first glance, the current application of the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax may not seem like much of an issue. But when
applied to the realities of college athletics, this results in a significant disparity
between public and private universities.
A. The Rise in College Athletic Salaries
It is no secret that college football coaches' salaries have been on the rise
over the last decade. In 2006, approximately forty-two football coaches earned
at least $1 million a year.77 By 2016, a decade later, twenty football coaches'
salaries topped $4 million, and twenty-five basketball coaches earned over
$2 million.78 In all, there are more than 240 NCAA Division I coaches’ and
athletic directors earning more than $1 million.79
76. Id.
77. Erik Brady et. al., NCAA Football Coaches' Average Salary at 1.64 Million, USA TODAY (Nov.
20, 2012), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2012/11/19/college-football-coaches-contract
s-analysis-pay-increase/1715435/.
78. Id.
79. See also Robert Lattinville & Roger Denny, supra note 4.
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As of 2020, there are approximately twenty-two Athletic Directors that
make a $1 million or more.80 With the highest compensated Athletic Director
being Jack Swarbrick of Notre Dame with a total compensation of just over
$2.5 million.81 Nick Saban of Alabama remains the highest paid Head Football
Coach with a total compensation of $9,300,000.82 As of 2020, more than ten
head football coaches make more than $5 million.83 Head Basketball coaches'
salaries have equally sored. The highest paid basketball coach is John Calipari
of Kentucky with a total compensation of over $8 million.84 On the basketball
side, three coaches now make more than $5 million, significantly more are
above the $2 million dollar mark.85 And significantly, as of 2019, at least
nine college baseball coaches are now making more than $1 million.86
Athletic directors and coaches continue to be some of the highest paid
individuals in educational institutions, and the demand for higher salaries
continues to grow.
B. Application of the Excise Tax
As currently interpreted by the IRS, the 21% excise tax will apply to private
institutions but not public universities that are federal instrumentalities. This has
significant cost implications for private institutions and/or public universities
that are exempt under 501(c)(3). The best way to illustrate the significance is
through an example using football coaches.
On the public university non-ATEO side is Nick Saban, a six-time National
Coach of the year and a multi-time BCS National Champion, and the head
football coach of the Alabama Crimson Tide.87 On the private university side is
David Shaw a Pac-12 championship coach with multiple bowl appearances, and
the head coach of the Stanford Cardinals.88
80. 2019-2020 Athletics Directors, Spencer Fane LLP (2020), http://www.sportsinfo.pro/
AthleticDirector2020.html
81. Id.
82. Steve Berkowitz et. al., Top NCAAF Coach Pay, USA Today, https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/
salaries/football/coach (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
83. Id.
84. Steve Berkowitz et. al., Top NCAAB Coach Pay, USA Today, https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/
salaries/mens-basketball/coach/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
85. Id.
86. Steve Berkowitz & Bob Nightengale, Top College Baseball Coaches Make Major-League
Money; At Least Nine at $1 Million or More, USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/baseball/2019/06/15/coach-salaries-college-baseballs-best-make-more-some-mlbmanagers/1455405001/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
87. Nick Saban, Alabama Football, The University of Alabama Athletics, https://rolltide.com/
sports/football/roster/coaches/nick-saban/683 (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
88. David Shaw, Stanford Football, Stanford University Athletics, https://gostanford.com/sports/
football/roster/coaches/david-shaw/3786 (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
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Nick
Saban

David
Shaw

Compensation

$9,300,000

$4,812,197

Compensation
over $1 Million

$8,300,000

$3,812,197

Excise Tax @
21%

$1,743,000

$800,561
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Under the current guidance, the University of Alabama escapes $1,743,000 in
tax, while Stanford pays $800,561 in excise tax. Traditionally, private university
salaries are lower than public universities. But now, in addition to being
significantly lower, they are also now subject to significantly more tax. In
addition to that, the institution is responsible for paying that tax. In other words,
the institution must come up with the cash to pay the tax owed.
C. Differences for Public and Private Institutions
The NCAA, the largest collegiate sports organization, currently has
358 Division I member schools.89 Of those schools, 237 are designated as public
and 121 are designated as private.90 The ability to attract and retain talent often
depends on the ability to pay that talent; often, the universities' ability to attract
donors to raise funds to pay those coaches. A good conference example of where
the tax could make significant impact is the Pac-12. The Pac-12 consists of the
following organizations and head football coach salaries:

89. Division I Institutions, NCAA, https://web3.ncaa.org/directory/memberList?type=12&
division=I (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
90. Id. The designation of private versus public is based on the NCAA designation and is not a
reflection of the public university classifications under the internal revenue code. As such, some of
these public institutions may be organized as section 501(c)(3) organizations, exempt under section
115(a), or take the position they are exempt under implied statutory immunity.

NETTLETON 32.1

132

1/10/22 9:10 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

University Name

Head Football
Coach Salary

Arizona State
University-Tempe

Private/Public
Public – appears
to take
immunity91

University of Arizona

Public – 115(a)92

$3,283,333

University of
California-Berkeley

Public –
501(c)(3)93

$3,276,248

University of
California-Los Angeles

Public –
501(c)(3)94

$4,300,000

University of Southern
California

Private –
501(c)(3)95
Public – appears
to take
immunity96

University of Colorado
Boulder
Oregon State
University
University of Oregon

Public – 115(a)
Public – appears
to take
immunity97

[Vol. 32.1

$3,640,000

$4,569,507
$3,040,000
$2,288,000
$2,542,500

91. Letter from Susan M. O’Neill, IRS Dep’t Manager of Accounts Management Operations, to
Ariz. State Univ. (Apr. 30, 2018) https://www.asu.edu/fs/documents/ASU-tax-exempt-letter.pdf.
92. See Letter from Shawn Clodfelter, Univ. of Ariz. Senior Tax Compliance Acct., to Univ. of
Ariz. Donors and Sponsors (Jan. 2, 2019) https://www.fso.arizona.edu/sites/fso/files/201901/Donors_Sponsors_2019.pdf.
93. Tax Status of the Regents of the University of California, UNIV. OF CAL.,
https://www.ucop.edu/research-policy-analysis-coordination/resources-tools/about-uc/tax-status-ofthe-regents-of-the-university-of-california.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
94. Id. See also Aprill, supra note 27 at 110 n.146.
95. Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/exempt-organizations-business-master-file-extract-eo-bmf (last updated Oct. 11,
2021).
96. Tax-Exempt Status, UNIV. OF CO., https://www.cu.edu/psc/tax-exempt-status-0 (last visited
Dec. 1, 2021).
97. Letter from Lucinda J. Comegys, IRS Field Dir. of Accounts Mgmt., to Univ. of Or. (Nov. 2,
2020) https://pages.uoregon.edu/baoforms/bao_drupal_6/sites/ba.uoregon.edu/files/TaxExemptLetter
.pdf.
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University of Utah
Washington State
University
University of
Washington-Seattle
Campus
Stanford University

Public 501(c)(3)98

$4,634,178

Public –
501(c)(3)99

$2,870,000

Public –
501(c)(3)100

$2,912,500

Private –
501(c)(3)101

$4,812,197
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The Pac-12 illustrates the concern. Three institutions – Arizona State,
University of Colorado Boulder and University of Oregon – all take the position
that they are exempt from tax under statutory immunity, and thus under current
guidance are not subject to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax. The remaining
nine institutions, as currently structured, are subject to the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax. This provides a substantial benefit to the institutions
that are not subject to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax. To illustrate, let’s
use Arizona State University-Tempe Head Football Coach, Herm Edwards:
Herm
Edwards

David
Shaw

Compensation

3,640,000

4,812,197

Compensation over
$1 Million

2,640,000

3,812,197

Excise Tax @ 21%

554,400

800,561

If Arizona State were subject to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax, it would
be required to pay $554,000 in tax. To put this in perspective, the amount of tax

98. Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF), supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (Tax Identification Number 94-1156335). See also, Frequently Asked Questions,
STANFORD GIVING, https://giving.stanford.edu/faqs/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
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is roughly the equivalent of ASU's defensive coordinator salary.102 But,
currently, Arizona State does not have to pay that tax. Instead, theoretically,
ASU receives an indirect benefit allowing it to reinvest that money into its own
program, or rather, perhaps not have to eliminate lower-level positions. Whereas
Stanford, for example, will need to come up with the cash to pay the tax owed.
This could result in lower salaries for coaches or elimination of positions.
Most conferences have a mix of these three types of tax-exempt institutions
because the NCAA is made up of both private and public universities. The law
as it currently exists could lead to significant disparities between public and
private universities given the significant amount of tax. These disparities
include the need to raise money to pay the tax, decrease salaries, failure to attract
and retain top talent, and/or eliminate positions.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Given that the Excess Compensation Excise Tax is fairly new, a direct
impact on college athletics has not been seen or felt. The disparity will likely
take years to play out and show an impact. However, there are tax planning
solutions that can be utilized to address the disparity.
A. Legislators Should Ask What Really is the Intent of the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax
While the purpose of this article is not to make a conclusion on whether
section 4960 or the IRS' current guidance is correct, it would be remiss not to
mention that legislators should consider what the true intent of the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax is. Is it truly to level the playing field between forprofits and non-profits?
It is undeniable that executive salaries continue to grow. But when
compared, are non-profit executive compensation rates out of control such that
they should be subject to a 21% tax? Let's compare the top three salaries for
publicly traded for-profit salaries to non-profit salaries:

102. Arizona, ASU Football and Basketball Coaches' 2019 Salaries Unveiled, ARIZ. SPORTS (Oct.
22, 2019, 12:09 PM), https://arizonasports.com/story/2128071/arizona-asu-football-and-basketballcoaches-2019-salaries-unveiled/.
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For-Profit103
Company
Name
Salary

Tesla
Oak Street
Health

Good RX

568,442,024.00

Non-profit104
Organization
Name
Salary
Kaiser
Foundation
Health Plan
Inc.
15,709,853.00
Delta Dental
Plan of
Michigan
14,842,204.00

497,838,903.00

United States
Steel and
Carnegie
Pension Fund

6,658,803,818.00
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13,423,001.00

Admittedly, compensation of executives is complicated, and as such this is
not a perfect comparison. However, it illustrates that non-profit executive
compensation is a fraction of large publicly traded company executive salaries.
The top three head football coaches' salaries are even lower, ranging from 9-8
million.105 And unlike the private company, who may use other tax deductions
to offset the recognition of income, non-profits are forced to pay a pure 21% tax
on the compensation above $1 million. To put that in perspective, Tesla paid
approximately $292 million in U.S. taxes in 2020.106 Had Tesla paid the
21% tax on Elon Musk's salary, it would have paid $1.3 billion in taxes alone.
Yet, the Kaiser Foundation will pay $3 million in excise tax on Bernard Tyson's
salary.
In the broad scheme of things, does the 21% tax seem fair? Should public
and private universities be subject or not subject to the tax? These are broader
questions I will leave to the policy-makers to address. But it is fair to put this
question back on policy-makers, and for them to consider the broader impacts
of the Excess Compensation Excise Tax.
As for public and private universities there are a number of tax-planning
solutions that can be utilized.

103. Anders Melin, Elon Musk's Outrageous Moonshot Award Catches on Across America,
BLOOMBERG WEALTH (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-highest-paid-ceos/.
104. Jason Urbaniec, Top 10 Highest Paid CEOs at Nonprofits 2021, ECON. RSCH INST. (June 15,
2020), https://www.erieri.com/blog/post/top-10-highest-paid-ceos-at-nonprofits-2021.
105. See Berkowitz et. al., supra note 82.
106. Tesla Income Taxes 2009-2021, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/
TSLA/tesla/total-provision-income-taxes (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
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B. Relinquish 501(c)(3) Status
The first planning option that public universities, who may be subject to the
Excess Compensation Excise Tax, can consider is relinquishing their 501(c)(3)
status as indicated by IRS Notice 2019-09.107 In order to relinquish 501(c)(3)
status, an organization must follow the procedures described in section 3.01(12)
of Revenue Procedure 2018-5.108 Public universities must weigh all the
consequences of relinquishing their 501(c)(3) status before utilizing this option.
However, in order to utilize this option, the organization will need to have
another basis for exemption other than 115(a) or Section 501(a) otherwise it will
still be subject to the tax.109 In other words, this option is really only viable for
public universities that can take the position that they are exempt from tax under
statutory immunity. Public universities that can utilize this option should also
consider whether they should seek a Form 6166 providing them with an IRS
determination letter indicating that they are exempt from tax under statutory
immunity.110
C. Compensation Planning
Another option to keep coaches of certain public universities (those that
chose not to relinquish their 501(c)(3) status or are 115(a) organizations) and
private universities competitively compensated is to consider other ways of
providing income. An option is to supplement the base contract salary with more
impressive employee compensation and benefits packages that may include
items like life insurance options, retirement plan contributions, and deferred
compensation. These arrangements are increasingly common in the business
and sports world.111
One primary example of an alternative structure is that which exists for the
University of Michigan ("UM") and Jim Harbaugh. The contract between UM
and Harbaugh includes below-market split-dollar term loan advances in the
amount of $2 million per year.112 This allowed Harbaugh to obtain a sizeable
life insurance policy. Under the policy's terms, Harbaugh can recognize the cash
value of the life insurance policy by borrowing directly from it.113 Upon death,
the proceeds of the life insurance policy will be used to repay UM for the loans
107. I.R.S. Notice 2019-09, 2019-04 I.R.B. 403.
108. Id. Rev. Proc. 2018–5, 2018–1 I.R.B. 233, 239.
109. See 26 U.S.C. § 4960.
110. See Letter from Susan M. O’Neill, IRS Dep’t Manager of Accounts Management Operations,
to Ariz. State Univ., supra note 91.
111. See also Lattinville & Denny, supra note 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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under the coaching contract, and any remainder will go to Harbaugh's estate.114
All tax free.115 Proceeds from the loans are not taxable, and they are not
considered renumeration under section 4960.116
Another example is deferred compensation. Section 4960 applies to all
renumeration. Renumeration is treated as paid when there is no substantial risk
of forfeiture of rights to such renumeration. Substantial risk of forfeiture exists
when the person's right to compensation is conditioned upon his or her future
performance of substantial services.117 In order to avoid the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax, universities could structure contracts such that a
substantial risk of forfeiture lapses pursuant to a schedule that reduces the
amount to be included in renumeration each year. For example, a university
might offer a contract that pays $1 million, which vests $200,000 per year over
five years subject to the recipient maintaining employment through the end of
each year. This approach would treat $200,000 as renumeration each year.
Contrast this with a contract where the $1 million payment vests only at the end
of the five-year period subject to the recipient maintaining employment through
such date. In that case, the $1 million is included as remuneration all in one year.
There are complex tax code provisions that govern these types of
compensation agreements. Institutions should carefully consider these options
and the legal and tax ramifications associated with them.
D. Third Party Supplement University Pay
Another option is to maximize that amount of compensation that can come
from unrelated third parties. Prior to section 4960, it was common for
universities to utilize foundation accounts to pay portions of a coaches' salary
or to purchase benefits on behalf of the coach.118 For example, in 2013, the
Crimson Tide Foundation purchased housing for University of Alabama Head
Football Coach Nick Saban.119 However, section 4960 contains related party
rules that include in the definition of renumeration, amounts paid by a related
party.120 Most university foundations will be treated as related to the ATEO
because they are organized as a supporting organization or have similar
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(3) (note there are other considerations such as cancelation of indebtedness
income and income from forgiven or below market interest rates.).
117. I.R.C. § 457(f)(3)(B).
118. 2020 NCAA Football Head Coach Salaries Methodology, USA TODAY SPORTS (Aug. 4, 2021,
11:12 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/08/04/college-football-2020-ncaa-he
ad-coach-salaries-methodology/5482805001/.
119. Id.
120. I.R.C § 4960(c)(4).
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control.121 As such, universities will need to look to other unrelated third-parties
to creatively structure coaching agreements that will not be subject to the Excess
Compensation Excise Tax.
These alternative structures can include: renegotiating sponsorship
agreements; additional compensation from outside groups; allowing coaches to
run and profit from summer camps and clinics; income from endorsements; and
game or venue revenue sharing. These ideas are not necessarily new to college
athletics, rather a greater emphasis may be placed on them to avoid the
21% excise tax.122
Using summer camps as an example, the university can allow the coach to
own the rights to the summer camps and to operate the camp on school property.
Generally, two conditions must be met in order for the coach to retain the profits
of the summer camp: (1) the camp must be advertised in the coaches name
alone, and (2) the coach must pay all fees to conduct the camp (even if it is at
discounted rates).123 Summer camps have traditionally been lucrative making
thousands of dollars.124 There are also additional ways to capitalize on summer
camps including merchandise, and perhaps broadcasting rights. Therefore,
summer camps along with clinics could be one alternative to shifting income to
coaches and avoiding the Excess Compensation Excise Tax.
Another alternative proposed is allowing coaches to capitalize on their
name, image, and likeness by universities renegotiating sponsorship deals to
allow coaches to receive or maximize income.125 The king of this method in
recent years was Roy Williams, the former University of North Carolina
Basketball coach. A significant portion of Williams' income was earned from
outside sources, as disclosed by his 2015 "[n]otice of intent to earn outside
income."126 This disclosure revealed outside compensation agreements with
Sirona Dental Systems, Nike Championship Clinics, Raleigh Sports Club,
Learfield Sports – Tar Heel Sports Properties, Nike, and RWW Enterprises.127
Jumping off this model, universities could work with interested parties to
increase outside compensation. One interesting proposal by Robert Lattinville
and Roger Denny of Spence Fane, LLP was for universities to renegotiate
sponsor contracts to offload coaches' compensation. They provide the following
example:
121. Id.
122. See Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical Perspective, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127 (2001) (for a discussion of college coaching contracts and special
provisions.).
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id. at 205.
125. See also Lattinville & Denny, supra note 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Virginia Tech's current Nike Contract provides for $275,000 of
Base (Cash) Compensation and a Supplied Product Limit of
$1,625,000. A more efficient structure, in light of §4960, may
be to (1) allow current coaches to contract directly with Nike,
using university marks and other university property, and in
exchange therefor, (2) agree to a lower Supplied Product Limit.
Virginia Tech would then be able to use the increased cash
available (from the offloaded coach compensation) to purchase
additional product (presumably at an increase of less than
21%).128
The Nike example applies to other vendors such as Learfield Sports (TV
Broadcasting) and other independent sponsors. Essentially, the coach is
profiting off of his or her name, image, and likeness without it being governed
by his or her university contract. This will likely be similar to what we see play
out with college athletes.
The one caveat to this solution is that universities will likely need to work
with coaches to assist with self-employment taxes. Under the previous model,
the compensation came from the university as W-2 wages that were required to
have federal and state tax withheld and are not subject to self-employment
tax.129 Under the proposal, coaches would be contracting directly with sponsors
and would be considered independent contractors. As such, coaches will receive
1099 income which is subject to self-employment tax. Along with selfemployment tax, there are also additional compliance issues related with being
an independent contractor that coaches will need to be aware of (i.e., insurance
and estimated payments). Sophisticated coaches with representation will likely
attempt to negotiate for a portion of the Excess Compensation Excise Tax
savings to help with their self-employment obligations.130
CONCLUSION
The IRC has generally provided public and private universities with
favorable tax-exempt status. Under the IRC, public universities are exempt from
tax either as 501(c)(3) organizations, the provisions of section 115(a), or under
the doctrine of statutory immunity. Similarly, private universities are exempt
from tax as 501(c)(3) organizations.
Compensation paid by both private and public universities is subject to
128. Id.
129. See I.R.C. § 3401.
130. Id.
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certain limitations and restrictions, such as private benefit and private inurement
doctrines. However, generally, if the compensation paid is reasonable, these
institutions pay no tax. However, the TCJA took a significant step in imposing
an excise tax on these institutions. The new Excess Compensation Excise Tax
imposes a 21% tax on ATEO for renumeration in excess of $1 million. The
Excess Compensation Excise Tax does not exclude reasonable compensation
and, under current guidance, applies to all ATEOs except for those exempt
under statutory immunity.
The current guidance and applicability of the Excess Compensation Excise
Tax leads to a disparity between public universities that are statutorily immune,
and public universities that are organized under 501(c)(3), public universities
organized under 115(a), along with private universities exempt under 501(c)(3).
This has significant impacts on college athletics and coaches' and athletic
director's salaries.
The significance of the tax could lead to striking disparities within college
athletic conferences, and college athletics as a whole. As such, public
universities that are organized under 501(c)(3), or 115(a), and private
universities exempt under 501(c)(3) need to engage in tax planning and
restructuring of coaches and athletic director salaries in order to limit or avoid
exposure to the Excess Compensation Excise Tax. There are several methods
that universities can employ such as relinquishing exempt status, engaging in
compensation planning, and utilizing unrelated third parties to provide
compensation.

